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Collisions
JOSEPH C. SWEENEY*
I
INTRODUCTION
An admiralty student who envisions Supreme Court review of important
maritime issues must be fantasizing or living in the past. In contrast to 1816,
when admiralty and maritime cases made up 25% of the Court's docket,'
today they account for less than one percent. 2 Moreover, the Supreme
Court's frequent denial of certiorari in cases raising important maritime
issues (other than the longshore statute) means that courts of appeal will
continue to determine the law for the various circuits, despite the apparent
demand of the Constitution for uniformity.3 Nevertheless, I offer the
*The John D. Calamari Distinguished Professor of Law, Fordham University. A.B., Harvard
University; J.D., Boston University; LL.M., Columbia University. Member of the Editorial Board of the
Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce.
11 C. Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History 454 (1926) (noting that of 400 cases
decided from 1800 to 1816, 25% involved admiralty and shipping (war, neutrality, prize, embargo, and
non-intercourse); another 25% involved practice or procedure; 2.7% involved slavery; 2.5% involved
citizenship issues; and 1.5% raised federal constitutional questions).2Hughes, An Introduction: Principles and Pragmatism, 21 Tul. Mar. L.J. 1, 5 (1996), cited in
Robertson, Summertime Sailing and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Need for a National Admiralty Court,
29 J. Mar. L. & Com. 275, 276 (1998) (concluding that maritime cases make up .045% of the total federal
docket).3There are two constitutional sources of admiralty uniformity: Article I, § 8 ("To regulate Commerce
with foreign nations and among the several States .. ") and Article III, § 2 ("The judicial power shall
extend to ... all Cases of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction ... ").
Under Article I, the line of cases beginning with Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824),
Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852), and The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557
(1871), a broad, all-encompassing federal power was loosed to contend with observed state police powers
under the Tenth Amendment, see The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), and The Passenger
Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849), under the Court's "selective exclusiveness" doctrine. Federal control
of state economic regulations must today meet the "tests" of Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985), a 5-4 decision imperilled by decisions like Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v.
Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 1996 AMC 305 (1996), and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). For
modem maritime cases on federal preemption, see Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 1978
AMC 527 (1978), and Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 1960 AMC 1549
(1960). See generally Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Clause, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1987).
Article III became a potent source for overriding state law in favor of the uniformity of the general
maritime law in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 1996 AMC 2076 (1917). (Arguably
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following short list of issues that I believe need Supreme Court review:
uniformity of maritime tort,4 abolition of The Pennsylvania Rule,5 and fault
as the sole determinant of liability.6
II
UNIFORMITY OF MARITIME TORT
The academic community, unlike the admiralty bar, is currently entangled
in a debate on the sources of admiralty jurisdiction and the substantive law
of the admiralty courts because of the suggestion by Professor William R.
Casto7 that the 18th century framers' vision of "admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction"8 was limited to public law (prize, piracy, and smuggling) rather
than the private law of torts and contracts. The dramatic corollary of this
suggestion is that the source of private admiralty law must be state common
law.9 The consequence of state law sources is a refutation of the mandatory
uniformity of substantive admiralty law' 0 and the toleration of state common
law' t and statutory law' 2 in a federal court sitting in admiralty. In other
words, "local law" is no longer an exception to the rule for application of the
uniform general maritime law but the rule itself.' 3
The problem case, never overruled, is Belden v. Chase,14 a collision of
two steam-driven vessels on navigable waters (the Hudson River-beyond
"uniformity" was a desperate effort to find rationale in a 5-4 decision for striking down workers'
compensation legislation following N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917), workers'
compensation that had survived attack based on substantive due process.) The Jensen case was reinforced
by Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 1942 AMC 1645 (1942), Kermarec v. Cie. Generale
Transatlantique,'358 U.S. 625, 1959 AMC 597 (1959), and Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731,
1961 AMC 833 (1961), but questioned in Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325,
1973 AMC 811 (1973).
4See infra notes 7-38 and accompanying text.
5See infra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
6See infra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
7See Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers and
Pirates, 37 Am. J, Legal Hist. 117 (1993) [hereinafter cited as Casto 1]. Cf. Gutoff, Original
Understandings and the Private Law Origins of the Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction: A Reply to Professor
Casto, 30 J. Mar. L. & Com. 361 (1999), and Casto, Additional Light on the Origins of Federal Admiralty
Jurisdiction, 31 J. Mar. L. & Com. 143 (2000).
8The identical phrase, "Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction," is found in Article Ill, § 2 of the 1787
Constitution and § 9 of the First Judiciary Act, Act of Sept. 24, 1789, Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 76. "Jurisdiction"
is capitalized in the Constitution but spelled with a small "j" in the statute.
9Casto 1. supra note 7, at 122.
t°See supra note 3. See also G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty 49 (2d ed. 1975).
'1American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 1994 AMC 913 (1994).
12Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199, 1996 AMC 305 (1996).
13See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 1973 AMC 811 (1973).
14150 U.S. 674 (1893), cited by Justice Holmes in his dissent to Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205, 222, 1996 AMC 2076 (1917).
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the ebb and flow of the tide), a jurisdiction apparently claimed for federal
admiralty law in 1851 by Chief Justice Taney in The Genesee Chief v.
Fitzhugh.15 In Belden, the Supreme Court clearly approved the common law
defense of contributory negligence in a vessel collision case tried in a state
court. As will be shown, this decision must be either overruled or explained
away.
The action began and ended in the courts of the State of New York; four
jury trials were required to put it to rest. 16 In between the third and fourth
trials, the case went to the United States Supreme Court on a writ of error
to the New York State Court of Appeals. While the case has continued
validity interpreting the "special circumstances" rule of the then Inland
Rules, 17 it has become "notorious" because the Supreme Court applied the
common law rule of "no recovery due to contributory negligence" to a
collision on navigable waters.18
The pleasure yacht Yosemite, 182 feet in length, was steaming upstream
on the east side of the Hudson River, about 90 miles north of New York
City; the steamboat Charlotte Vanderbilt, 207 feet in length, was steaming
downstream on the west side of the river. 19 Because the Yosemite and the
Charlotte were about to pass head to head, the Yosemite gave a one short
blast whistle signal for a port to port passing, answered by the Charlotte with
a one short blast whistle. The Charlotte, however, then began to cross from
the west side to the east side of the river, during which maneuver she gave
the two blast signal for a starboard passing, which was not answered by the
Yosemite. Thus, while heading east the Charlotte crossed directly in front of
the on-coming Yosemite and was struck on the starboard side at right angles
with such violent force that the bow of the Charlotte separated and both
parts of the ship sank instantly. The collision and sinking occurred at about
9:00 p.m. on July 14, 1882.20
The action at law in the New York state court was initiated by the
executors for the owner of the sunken Charlotte, alleging faulty navigation
of the Yosemite in failing to comply with the Charlotte's announced two
whistle intention for a starboard passing together with the absence of white
J553 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 1999 AMC 2092 (1851), an 8-1 decision with a dissent by Justice Daniel.16The proceedings are reported at Chase v. Belden, 34 Hun. 571 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1884), rev'd, 9 N.E.
852 (N.Y. 1887), and Chase v. Belden, 1 N.Y.S. 48 (Sup. Ct. 1888), aff'd, 22 N.E. 963 (N.Y. 1889),
rev'd, 150 U.S. 674 (1893).
17See Rule 24 ("In construing and obeying these rules, due regard must be had to all dangers of
navigation, and to any special circumstances which may exist in any particular case rendering a departure
from them necessary in order to avoid immediate danger.").
1150 U.S. at 691 (citing Atlee v. Packet Co., 88 (21 Wall.) 389 (1874)).
191d. at 676.
2
°ld. at 676-79.
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range lights as required by federal law. 2' The Yosemite defended on the basis
of the Charlotte's failure to comply with the agreed method of passing by
going to starboard and failure to slow and sound a danger signal. 22 The
Yosemite admitted fault in the absence of the two white range lights.
At the third trial, the jury gave a verdict for the plaintiff (the Charlotte)
for the value of the sunken vessel ($27,668), which was affirmed by the
Supreme Court General Term and the Court of Appeals without an opinion
for the majority but with a dissent.23 The United States Supreme Court
reversed in an opinion by Chief Justice Fuller,24 with a concurrence by
Justice Brown, the Court's admiralty expert. 25
At the outset, the Chief Justice described the case as "a maritime tort
committed upon navigable waters and within the admiralty jurisdiction; 26
however, because of the plaintiff's choice of a common law remedy in state
court, the state's common law defense of contributory negligence was held
applicable and used to deny the plaintiff all recovery (as opposed to the
equal division of damages rule applicable in admiralty). 27 Because of the
plaintiff's admission that it had not used running lights, the plaintiff had to
prove that the defendant's negligence (i.e., the failure to carry the two white
range lights) was the sole cause of the injury. Virtually the entire opinion
deals with the facts of the collision; discussion of earlier case law is minimal.
The Supreme Court concluded that the Yosemite was not required to carry
the range lights as an enrolled coasting vessel that also enjoyed the foreign
travel status of a registered vessel, but was exempt from the range light
requirement as a pleasure yacht designed as a model of naval architecture. 28
Thus, the defendant Yosemite was not negligent. Furthermore, the plaintiff
could not meet the burden of proof of The Pennsylvania29 that its negligence
did not and could not have contributed to the disaster. Reversal was required
because the trial judge's general negligence instruction "disposed of a
federal right" without the correct instructions as to the obligatory nature of
the federal statute. 30 Justice Brown was compelled to write a concurrence
denying recovery to the Charlotte because of her contributory negligence,
21Id. at 678.221d.
2322 N.E. 963 (N.Y. 1889).
24150 U.S. at 690.
251d. at 703.
261d. at 691.
27 1d. (citing The Max Morris v. Curry, 137 U.S. 1 (1890)).
28 1d. at 697 (citing Act of Aug. 7, 1848, 9 Stat. 274, c. 141).
2986 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1874).
30150 U.S. at 703.
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but could not accept the Chief Justice's interpretation that range lights were
not required.3'
Belden v. Chase remains an anomaly. It is not part of the series of cases
denominated as "maritime but local" where a state statute is applied instead
of a conflicting federal rule, such as Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v.
Calhoun,32 International Paper Co. v. Ouellette,33 and Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit.34 Rather, it belongs with such collision
decisions as Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson35 and such tort cases as
Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co. 36 and Kermarec v. Cie. Generale Trans-
atlantique.3 7 As such, a clean and clear overruling of Belden v. Chase is
needed to "tidy" up admiralty tort jurisdiction. 38
III
ABOLITION OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RULE
Under this 1874 rule, applicable to both-to-blame collisions at a time
when the damages of colliding vessels were equally divided, a vessel that
has committed a statutory fault is faced with the difficult burden of proving
that the fault not only did not cause the collision, but could not have caused
the collision. 39 The Supreme Court thereby created a presumption of
causation. 40
The Court cited no authority, and provided no rationale, for the rule. The
only case cited was an English case, The Fenham,41 recently decided by the
Privy Council, to the effect that a vessel navigating without running lights
311d. at 704-05.
32516 U.S. 199, 1996 AMC 305 (1996).
33479 U.S. 481 (1987).
14362 U.S. 440, 1960 AMC 1549 (1960).
35457 U.S. 668, 1982 AMC 2253 (1982).
36317 U.S. 239, 1942 AMC 1645 (1942).
37358 U.S. 625, 1959 AMC 597 (1959).
38Tidy rules on jurisdiction were scorned by Justice Marshall in his opinions in Foremost, supra note
35, and Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 1990 AMC 1801 (1990).39 Specifically, the case holds:
But when, as in this case, a ship at the time of collision is in actual violation of a statutory rule
intended to prevent collisions, it is no more than a reasonable assumption that the fault, if not the
sole cause, was at least a contributory cause of the disaster. In such a case the burden rests upon
the ship of showing not merely that her fault might not have been one of the causes, or that it
probably was not, but that it could not have been.
The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 136 (1874) (emphasis added).4 0
"The burden rests upon the ship of showing.., that it could not have been [one of the causes]." Id.
at 136. See Zapf, The Growth of the Pennsylvania Rule: A Study of Causation in Maritime Law, 7 J. Mar.
L. & Com. 521 (1976).
41[1870] L.R. 3 P.C. 212, 23 Law Times 329.
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will be held in fault unless she proves that the absence of lights did not cause
the collision.
A possible explanation for The Pennsylvania Rule is the timing of the
decision. Fast steel ships using steam power, no longer responding to the
intricacies of winds and currents, were becoming more plentiful and were
causing more serious damages when they collided. Statutory rules to prevent
collisions had been adopted, first in Great Britain in 1863,42 then in France
the same year,43 and then in the United States in 1864. 44 In 1872, these
foreign regulations were held by the Supreme Court to be part of the
international law of the sea.45 A short time earlier, the Court had established
the in rem liability of vessels under the conn of compulsory pilots;46
announced The Louisiana Rule,47 which presumes fault when a moving
vessel strikes a non-moving vessel; and created the rule of joint and several
liability (so that innocent claimants could collect their entire damages in
collision from the non-carrying vessel).48 Thus, in a 10-year period a new
regime for statutory collision liability had been created that required a rule
to prevent slick evasions; 49 such was presumably achieved by The Pennsyl-
vania Rule.
The Pennsylvania Rule has been severely criticized over the years, but
appellate courts continue to adhere to it when directly confronted by it.50
Nevertheless, the admiralty bar eventually learned to avoid The Pennsylva-
nia Rule by arguing non-contributory fault.51
Because The Pennsylvania Rule certainly contemplated the rule of equal
division of damages in both-to-blame collisions, even if it was not based
42The Merchant Shipping Act of 1862, 25 & 26 Vict., c. 63, authorized the Board of Trade to issue
its Sea Regulations in 1863, compiling and expanding various partial regulations required by Parliament
since 1846. See Owen, The Origins and Development of Marine Collision Law, 51 Tul. L. Rev. 759, 783
(1977).431d. at 784.
44Act of Apr. 29, 1864, Ch. 69, 13 Stat. 58. See Owen, supra note 42, at 786.45The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 (1872).
46The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53 (1868).
4770 U.S. (3 Wall.) 164 (1867).
48The Washington and The Gregory, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 513 (1870) (personal injury). See also The
Alabama and The Gamecock, 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 695 (1876), and The Atlas, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 302 (1876).49The equal division of damages between vessels in both-to-blame collisions had been established
(without benefit of statutory rules of the road) in The Schooner Catherine v. Dickinson, 58 U.S. (7 How.)
170 (1855), described by Justice Nelson as "the most just and equitable, and as best tending to induce
care and vigilance on both sides, in the navigation." Id. at 178. That case was overruled as "palpably
unfair," "unnecessarily crude," and "inequitable" in United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397,
405, 407, 1975 AMC 541 (1975).5 0Tetley, The Pennsylvania Rule-An Anachronism? The Pennsylvania Judgment-An Error?, 13 J.
Mar. L. & Com. 127 (1982).
51China Union Lines, Ltd. v. A.O. Anderson & Co., 364 F.2d 769, 1966 AMC 1653 (5th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 933 (1967); The Aakre, 122 F.2d 469, 1941 AMC 1263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 690 (1941); The Mabel, 35 F.2d 731, 1929 AMC 1688 (2d Cir. 1929).
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thereon, it should have been overruled when the equal division rule was
abolished and the proportional fault rule adopted. Unfortunately, it was
not.
5 2
The Court has not considered a case dealing with a presumption of
causation in the 25 years since Reliable Transfer. Obviously, the Court that
created The Pennsylvania Rule should overrule it. Nevertheless, one way of
removing the rtftd' would be for Congress to enact the provisions of the
time-tested language of the 1910 Brussels Collision Convention, 53 exclud-
ing, however, the provision for several rather than joint and several
liability. 54 Such legislation, following the suggestion of the Ninth Circuit in
Ishizaki Kisen Co. v. United States,55 wherein Judge Sneed referred to
Article VI of the Convention, 56 which prohibits legal presumptions (whether
created by legislatures or courts), would repeal The Pennsylvania Rule.57
IV
PERCENTAGES OF FAULT AS THE SOLE DETERMINANT
OF LIABILITY
The Supreme Court's use of the word "fault" in Reliable Transfer58 seems
to make it clear that only degrees of culpability are to be compared in
assessing percentages of fault.59 Nevertheless, some American courts have
52Tug Ocean Prince, Inc. v. United States, 584 F.2d 1151, 1978 AMC 1786 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979). See also Peck, The Pennsylvania Rule Since Reliable Transfer, 15 J. Mar.
L. & Com. 95 (1984).53Intemational Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with Respect to Collisions
Between Vessels, Brussels, Sept. 23, 1910, 212 Consol. Treaty Ser. 178, reprinted at 6 Benedict on
Admiralty Doc. 3-2 (7th rev. ed. 1999). The convention came into force with 10 ratifications on March
1, 1913.54 Art. IV, second paragraph. See infra note 67.
"510 F.2d 875, 1975 AMC 287 (9th Cir. 1975).56 Collision Convention, supra note 53, at Art. VI, second paragraph ("II n'ya point de prdsomptions
16gales de faute quant A la responsabilitd de l'abordage." [There shall be no legal presumptions of fault
in regard to liability for collision.]).57
"We believe that Article 6 is addressed to presumptions such as the Pennsylvania Rule without
regard to whether they rest on judicial or legislative authority. Consistency in the interpretation of Article
6 requires this result because such presumptions in some nations may be contained in statutes while in
others in the opinions and judgments of courts." 510 F.2d at 882.
58United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 1975 AMC 541 (1975).
59According to the Court:
We hold that when two or more parties have contributed by their fault to cause property damage
in a maritime collision or stranding, liability for such damage is to be allocated among the parties
proportionately to the comparative degree of theirfault, and that liability for such damages is to
be allocated equally only when the parties are equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly to
measure the comparative degree of their fault.
Id. at 411 (emphasis added).
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been persuaded to follow the English rule whereby degrees of causation and
culpability are compared in determining percentages of fault.60
The language of Reliable Transfer certainly is in accordance with the text
of the 1910 Collision Convention; accordingly, American collision law
needs a clear statement that only degrees of culpability are to be compared
in assessing fault.The development of the proportional fault rule and the development of a
non-governmental international organization to unify and develop maritime
law are bound together.61 While the law of general average 62 was one of the
first projects of the International Law Association (ILA), 63 maritime lawyers
became concerned about the differences between the substantive rules of
collision liability in Europe.64 In 1889, the United States convened a
diplomatic conference dealing with a number of maritime problems,
including the rules of the road and a proposal for a permanent maritime
organization. 65 Maritime practitioners, however, favored an industry-based
organization that would arrive at practical rather than theoretical solutions.
Their organization would unify maritime law by multilateral treaties,
rather than the Washington Conference method of draft legislation, intended
to be uniform but subject to the vagaries of individual legislatures. The
resulting permanent organization, the Comit6 Maritime International (CMI),
60 See, e.g., Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Const. & Design Co., 565 F.2d 1129, 1978 AMC
2315 (9th Cir. 1977); In re Seiriki Kisen Kaisha, 629 F. Supp. 1374, 1986 AMC 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1986);
Afran Transport Co. v. S/T Maria Venizelos, 450 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Pa. 1978); S/S Helena, 1976 AMC
2013 (E.D. La. 1976). Cf. Gele v. Wilson, 616 F.2d 146, 1981 AMC 462 (5th Cir. 1980).
61Sweeney, Proportional Fault in Both-to-Blame Collisions, [1964] 11 Diritto Marittimo (Special ed.,
Studi in Onore di Giorgio Berlingieri) 549 (discussing the proportionality and joint and several liability
rules). See also Chauveau, L'Unification du Droit Maritime et le C.M.I., [1963] Rev. Trm. de Droit
Commercial 737; Franck, Les Origines do C.M.I., [1933] 11 Diritto Marittimo (Sp. ed., Studi in Onore di
Francesco Berlingieri) 215.62The York-Antwerp Rules on General Average, originally prepared in 1874, have been frequently
revised, most recently in 1994. The Rules are incorporated in many maritime industry documents.6 3The ILA was founded at Brussels in October 1873, a result of recent wars: the American Civil War
(1861-65) and the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71). The ILA conducts studies of international law
problems and reports solutions. See Olmstead, The International Law Association: A Worldwide
Organization for Development and Promotion of International Law, in The Present State of International
Law and Other Essays (M. Bus ed. 1973).
64Franck, L'Abordage en Droit International, J. Droit Int'l Priv6 252 (1895).65 The Washington Conference on International Maritime Law, convened by President Benjamin H.
Harrison, dealt with many prominent issues of the day: load lines, seaworthiness, compulsory sea lanes,
ice in the North Atlantic, uniform system of buoys, wreck reporting, qualifications of sea going officers,
and, most importantly, the rules of the road. See Final Acts and Protocols of Proceedings of the
International Maritime Conference, Oct. 16-Dec. 31, 1899, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Ex. Doc. No. 53
(1890).
The maritime law conference was hardly the first attempt at unifying maritime practice; in 1884, the
United States convened the International Meridian Conference in Washington attended by 26 nations that
selected the meridian of Greenwich Observatory in England as the prime meridian (GMT).
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made up of national maritime law associations, was organized in Brussels,
Belgium in June 1897.66 The first item on the agenda was the divergent
systems of liability for both-to-blame collisions: the French-Belgian system
of proportional fault, the English-American system of equal division of
damages, and the German-Dutch system denying recovery to both colliding
vessels. The solution adopted in 1897 was the rule of proportional fault.67
That first report (by Louis Franck of Belgium) had been sent out for
comments by the member associations. At the 1898 Antwerp meeting it was
approved by the British, French, Belgian, and Dutch associations, but
disapproved by the Germans because of the several liability to innocent
cargo.68
The formula for proportional fault liability in both-to-blame collisions
emerged from the CMI's 1899 London Conference. 69 It has been unchanged
essentially since then and is now found in Article IV of the 1910 Brussels
Collision Convention, 70 quoting first the French text, the only authentic
treaty language, followed by an English translation used unofficially in the
U.S. but based on a translation prepared in 1911 for British ratification by
parliamentary action:
S'il y a faute commune, la responsabilit6 de chacun des navires est
proportionnelle A la gravit6 des fautes respectivement commises; toutefois si,
d'apr~s les circonstances la proportion ne peut pas 6tablie ou si les fautes
apparaissent comme equivalantes, la responsabilit6 est partagre par parts
6gales. [If two or more vessels are in fault the liability of each shall be in
proportion to the degree of faults respectively committed. Provided that if,
having regard to the circumstances, it is not possible to establish the degree of
the respective faults, or if it appears that the faults are equal, the liability shall
be apportioned equally.]
After the CMI's 1902 Hamburg conference, the organization sought the
assistance of a government to convene a diplomatic conference to complete
the draft collision treaty. The Belgian government agreed to act as the
66CMI Bull. No. 1. See also the sources cited supra note 61.
67CMI Bull. No. 1, Report at 30 and 60. This preliminary report also preferred the system of several
liability (rather than joint and several liability) to limit recovery by innocent cargo to the percentages of
fault of each colliding vessel, a result favored in English law (see The Milan, 167 Eng. Rep. 167 (Adm.
1861)). This decision was taken before the Maritime Law Association of the United States (organized in
1899) had joined the CMI. Thereafter, American cargo interests were unable to persuade the CMI to alter
the rule; as a result, cargo interests consistently lobbied to prevent United States ratification of the treaty,
beginning in 1912 when President Taft sent only the salvage convention (the other convention concluded
at Brussels in 1910) to the Senate. The opposition of cargo owners and insurers continued in 1937 and
1961. when ratification of the 1910 collision convention was again considered.
68CMI Bull. No. 2; CMI Bull. No. 6, at 39.69CMI Bull. No. 4, at 71; CMI Bull. No. 6.7 0See supra note 53.
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convening authority. A preliminary conference in Brussels in February 1905
was not attended by the major maritime nations, 7' but a second call for. a
diplomatic conference to consider both collision and salvage in September
1910 was successful as 26 delegations attended. 72
Professor Francesco Berlingieri's study of the record of the Brussels
Diplomatic Conference of 1910 notes a colloquy that concerned both
degrees of fault and gravity of fault. 73 Nevertheless, Dean Ripert of the
French delegation advised that once causation had been established in
both-to-blame cases there normally should be an equal division of damag-
es.74 Despite these somewhat theoretical discussions, the formula "propor-
tionnelle A la gravit6 des fautes" remained unchanged.
In an English analysis of Article IV,75 Justice Brandon has said that
causative faults are considered from two angles: first, blameworthiness (i.e.,
culpability), and, second, the extent to which it contributed to the damage or
loss (i.e., causative potency). Examples of causatively potent faults are
excessive speed (whether in fog or clear weather) and an improper course
alteration that increases the angle of the blow or results in the blow
registering in an especially vulnerable area.
Culpability in a greater amount of liability will be placed on the ship that
creates danger or difficult navigation in the first place. Thus, the ship that
fails to react prudently or correctly will be held to a lesser amount of
liability. Different degrees of culpability will also be assessed where the
navigational fault is a fault of commission rather than omission.
V
CONCLUSION
This short list of issues may never be resolved by the Supreme Court, but
it is this writer's hope that uniformity of treatment will emerge in at least
some of the circuits. Problems in the Rules of the Road have not been
7 1Conference Internationale de Droit Maritime, 3 vols., Brussels, 1907; Vol. II, Session 12 (1905).72The delegations in attendance were as follows: Argentina, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Austria,
Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan,
Mexico, the Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Sweden, the United
States of America, and Venezuela.73Berlingieri, Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in Collision Cases and an Overview of the Concept of
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considered because resolution of them requires international action by the
International Maritime Organization. The 1972 Convention on the Interna-
tional Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea has already been
amended three times: in 1981, (effective 1983), 1987 (effective 1989), and
1989 (effective 1991) by the swift and easy process of tacit consent, a
demonstration that serious problems can be remedied when the will for
uniformity is present.

